The US Government's Regime-Change Playbook Won't Work in Iran
President Trump's recent threat to take action against Iran if its security forces killed peaceful protesters should have carried a warning label. Just 24 hours later, US special forces were involved in a botched operation in Venezuela, abducting President Nicolas Maduro and taking him to face trial on "narcoterrorism" charges. This brazen display of aggression underscores the limits of Trump's regime-change playbook when applied to a country like Iran.
Iran is not Venezuela, and attempts at military intervention would be doomed from the start. The Iranian government has a robust military infrastructure that would make any invasion extremely difficult, if not impossible. Unlike in Venezuela, where Maduro had abandoned his allies Russia and China, which weakened the opposition, Iran's vast network of business interests, including construction, telecommunications, and exports, ensures that its top commanders have a strong personal stake in regime survival.
Iran is also no Iraq - the landscape, urban areas, or even military dynamics are all vastly different from those encountered in 2003. The Islamic Republic has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of external aggression, most notably during the 12-day conflict with Israel in June, where Iranian weaknesses were revealed but ultimately proved unsustainable.
Moreover, any attempt to topple the Iranian regime would not be supported by key allies China and Russia. These powers are unlikely to abandon Iran, a strategic partner that surpasses Venezuela in importance. As such, the US would face a formidable opponent with access to advanced intelligence, weaponry, and diplomatic support.
Iran's internal protests, fueled by economic woes, may have been expected to become more widespread, but they have yet to reach the same level of intensity as in 2022. While some killings have taken place, there are currently no visible cracks in the regime's structure. History has shown that external aggression often serves to unite societies rather than create divisions.
Iran's government leaders have acknowledged the legitimacy of protesters' concerns and are taking steps to address them. This suggests that the Iranian authorities have a degree of flexibility and adaptability that would be difficult for an invading force to exploit.
The US may choose to isolate or remove individual leaders, as was done in Venezuela. However, attempting to control and transform a complex country like Iran is unlikely to succeed. Any such endeavor would inevitably lead to chaos and bloodshed on a far larger scale than in Iraq, posing significant risks to regional stability and global security.
President Trump's recent threat to take action against Iran if its security forces killed peaceful protesters should have carried a warning label. Just 24 hours later, US special forces were involved in a botched operation in Venezuela, abducting President Nicolas Maduro and taking him to face trial on "narcoterrorism" charges. This brazen display of aggression underscores the limits of Trump's regime-change playbook when applied to a country like Iran.
Iran is not Venezuela, and attempts at military intervention would be doomed from the start. The Iranian government has a robust military infrastructure that would make any invasion extremely difficult, if not impossible. Unlike in Venezuela, where Maduro had abandoned his allies Russia and China, which weakened the opposition, Iran's vast network of business interests, including construction, telecommunications, and exports, ensures that its top commanders have a strong personal stake in regime survival.
Iran is also no Iraq - the landscape, urban areas, or even military dynamics are all vastly different from those encountered in 2003. The Islamic Republic has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of external aggression, most notably during the 12-day conflict with Israel in June, where Iranian weaknesses were revealed but ultimately proved unsustainable.
Moreover, any attempt to topple the Iranian regime would not be supported by key allies China and Russia. These powers are unlikely to abandon Iran, a strategic partner that surpasses Venezuela in importance. As such, the US would face a formidable opponent with access to advanced intelligence, weaponry, and diplomatic support.
Iran's internal protests, fueled by economic woes, may have been expected to become more widespread, but they have yet to reach the same level of intensity as in 2022. While some killings have taken place, there are currently no visible cracks in the regime's structure. History has shown that external aggression often serves to unite societies rather than create divisions.
Iran's government leaders have acknowledged the legitimacy of protesters' concerns and are taking steps to address them. This suggests that the Iranian authorities have a degree of flexibility and adaptability that would be difficult for an invading force to exploit.
The US may choose to isolate or remove individual leaders, as was done in Venezuela. However, attempting to control and transform a complex country like Iran is unlikely to succeed. Any such endeavor would inevitably lead to chaos and bloodshed on a far larger scale than in Iraq, posing significant risks to regional stability and global security.